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Transfer pricing is an effort to minimize the tax burden by allocating corporate profits to the 
relations company with lower tax rates. This research aimed to analyze the effect of corporate 
governance, tunneling incentive and sales growth to practices transfer pricing. Quantitative 
method and secondary data of annual report. The populations in this research are 
manufacturing company sector basic and chemical industrial listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI) for years 2014-2017 totaling 13 sample companies selected by purposive 
sampling method.The analysis technique data used is a binary logistic regression.The results of 
this research indicates that the variable corporate governance and sales growth not effect on 
practice transfer pricing, while tunneling incentive positive effect on practice transfer pricing. 
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1. Research Background  
As for developing countries like Indonesia, nowadays the development of the economy 
is increasingly fast without boundaries. It makes the trade between countries easier and 
smoother which could be seen from the amount of companies began to expand its market by 
establishing a subsidiary in the country or abroad. However, tax regulations for multinational 
companies are no longer in line with global business changes across countries, ease of business 
mobility, increasing complexity of corporate structures and legal systems between countries 
including taxation rules, namely differences in tax rates that apply in each country (Mardiasmo 
2017). Rosa et al. (2017) said the transaction of international trade may involve multinational 
business group to become more complex not only in the form of transactions in goods 
but also capital and immovable property and indication for tax evasion to minimize the amount 
of taxes through the practice of transfer pricing, that is the way to increase the purchase price 
or reduce sales prices within the company. The purpose of multinational companies conduct 
transfer pricing are transferring gains or income earned to affiliated companies located in other 
countries, so that the burden of corporate tax will be lower and profits are magnified by the 
company higher. If the terms of transfer pricing manipulation, by an additional of manipulation 
word, is meant to refer to an activity to increase costs or degrade bill that aims to minimize the 
amount of the burden of tax payable (Setiawan 2014). 
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Figure 1. Taxation Issues 
As shown in figure 1, Henrayana (2015) reveals in a survey by Ernt & Youngtaxation 
issues related to transfer pricing become a major consideration to multinational companies. 
From the results of the respondents as much 35% proved that transfer pricing issues as much as 
32% showed a very critical and important thing to be faced by the company. 
The company's decision to conduct transfer pricing practices can be caused by corporate 
governance. Good governance is able to develop company law abiding, so that the better 
system of corporate governance, the controls conducted by the holder of an interest will be 
greater to influence decision making of transfer pricing, as research conducted by Rosa, 
Andini, & Raharjo (2017) and Agusto, Puspa, & Rifa (2018) show corporate governance 
which is proxied by the audit quality positively significantly affect transfer pricing. However, 
according to Winata (2014), the positive audit quality is not significant to the tax avoidance, 
including the practice of transfer pricing. 
The amount of incentives obtained by shareholders will do tunneling, the greater the 
tunneling the transfer pricing opportunity increases as research by Marfuah and Azizah 
(2014) and Santosa and Suzan (2018) show that tunneling incentives have a positive significant 
effect on transfer pricing. However, according to Rosa, Andini, & Raharjo (2017) tunneling 
incentive has significant negative result towards transfer pricing. Finally, growth of selling 
numbers gave impact to minimize the tax burden and the company will choose the practice 
of transfer pricing , as well as research Rahmawati (2017) and Purwanti and Sugiyarti (2017) 
show sales growth positive and significant influence of tax evasion. Nevertheless, according 
to Noviani, Diana, & Mawardi (2018) negative sales growth is not significant to tax avoidance. 
The author’s update in this study is by combining or innovating between interlaced or 
congruent independent and dependent variables. From the research conducted by Rosa, Andini, 
Raharjo (2017) the author will only re-examine the dependent variable of corporate 
governance, tunneling incentive to the dependent variable transfer pricing. Furthermore, the 
author adds one independet variable, namely sales growth, in which the greater the profit 
obtained, then the tax burden that must be borne by the company is also rising (Rahmawati 
2017). Therefore, sales growth could affect tax evasion but the author wants to re-check the 
extent of the sales growth mainly on the practice of transfer pricing. 
Based on the background, this research aims to test and prove the existence of corporate 
governance , tunneling incentives and sales growth affect the transfer pricing practice. 
 
1.1. Corporate Governance and Transfer Pricing  
According to Subagiastra et al. (2016), corporate governance is interconnection to the 
responsibilities between the shareholders, board members and commissioner including manager 
for the creation of a competitive performance to achieve a primary goal in the company. The 
shareholders wanted accurate financial statements audited by Public Accountant which one 
component of corporate governance is the quality of the audit because it had described how 
reporting matters relating to taxation on capital markets and General Meeting of Shareholders 
(RUPS- Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham) (Eksandy 2017). Then, the more qualified of audit in 
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a company, it tended not to manipulate earnings for tax purposes, but Noviastika, Mayowan 
and Karjo (2016) disclosed that corporate governance did not affect the activities of 
irregularities, especially as a basis for decisions on transfer pricing activities, so that the results 
of corporate governance are positive and not significantly affect transfer pricing. 
H1 : Corporate governance doesnot significantly affect the practice of transfer pricing. 
 
1.2. Tunneling Incentive and Transfer Pricing 
According to Mispiyanti (2015), tunneling incentive is an activity of transferring assets and 
profits of the company for the benefit of the majority, but the minority also bear the cost the 
burden that come out. Minority shareholders and other external parties are often disadvantaged 
by controlling shareholders because of the strong influence of the risk of exploitation, such as 
conglomerate business groups to control the business activities of the controlling party will lead 
to tunneling activities. Tunneling with parties that have a special relationship where when 
receivables increase can be interpreted as an increase in profits (Marfuah and Azizah, 
2014). The majority shareholders would make a way to generate high profits one of the ways is 
by transfer pricing (Saraswati and Sujana, 2017). Shareholders with a large ownership in the 
company, the expected return on dividends are also large so that it triggers transfer pricing 
(Santosa and Suzan, 2018). As result, it can reveal tunneling incentives that significantly affect 
transfer pricing. 
H2 : Tunneling incentive significantly influences the practice of transfer pricing. 
 
1.3. Sales Growth and Transfer Pricing 
According to Kennedy and Zuzana (2013), sales growth illustrates the level of increase in 
the number of sales from period year to year or from time to time. Negative sales growth 
indicates a decline in operating activities that have an impact on lowering company profits. The 
higher sales growth, it will affect a growing number of tax avoidance through transfer pricing. 
It is because of the level of sales are relatively large, so it will provide opportunities companies 
to obtain greater profits (Dewinta and Setiawan 2016). A large profit makes the tax burden 
even greater by the company (Purwanti and Sugiyarti 2017). Then, it can reveal significant 
positive sales growth affecting transfer pricing . 
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numbers and described descriptively. The type of data analyzes secondary data by using Annual 
Report. The population in this experiment is a basic manufacturing company and chemical 
industry sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2014-2017 through the 
official website that could be accessed on www.idx.co.id. The technique of sampling is 
purposive sampling in which the decision criteria of the sample has been set by the researcher. 
Sugiyono (2016) set the following criteria: 
1. The basic and chemical industrial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2014-2017. 
2. The basic and chemical industry companies were successively listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2014-2017. 
3. The basic and chemical industry companies successively submitted the 2014-2017 
annual report. 
4. Basic and chemical industry companies present financial statements in rupiah. 
5. Basic and chemical industrial companies are controlled by foreign company shares 
propietary as much as 20%. 
6. The company experienced delisting during 2014-2017. 
Therefore, the sample of this research are 13 companies with four years of observation, 
by that the sample size is 52. Here is the list of companies manufacturing base and chemical 
industry sectors which is used as the research samples. 
Table 1. Sample of Companies 
No Issuer Code Company name 
1 INTP PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk. 
2 SMCB PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk. 
3 AMFG PT Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk. 
4 IKAI PT Intikeramik Alamasri Industri Tbk. 
5 KIAS PT Keramika Indonesia Assosi Tbk. 
6 TOTO PT Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk. 
7 LION PT Lion Metal Works Tbk. 
8 LMSH PT Lionmesh Prima Tbk. 
9 PICO PT Pelangi Indah Canindo Tbk. 
10 ETWA PT Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk. 
11 JPFA PT Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk. 
12 PLAY PT Malindo Feedmill Tbk. 
13 Indonesian 
Embassy 
PT Kertas Basuki Rachmat Indonesia 
Tbk. 
The dependent variable of this study is transfer pricing . This dummy variable is assessed 
by 2 alternatives, namely related party sales and non-related party sales. Since. the sales price 
that is set is usually overriding the principle of fairness. The company has a sales transaction to 
a related party ( rated ) is given a value of 1 , while given a value of 0 for the company which 
there is no sales transaction to a related party (related). 
The independent variable used is corporate governance proxied by audit quality, where 
companies audited by The Big Ten Public Accounting Firm are considered better including, 
PriceWaterhouse Cooper - PWC KAP Haryanto Sahari, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu KAP 
Osman Bing Satrio, KMPG KAP Sidharta & Sidartha Widjaja, Ernest & Young - E&Y KAP 
Purwanto Sarwoko Sandjaja, RSM AAJ Mc Gladrey & Pullen, Grant Thornton, CBIZ Mayer 
Hoffman Mc Cann, BDO USA, Crowe Horwath and BKD . Then, the value of 1 audited by 
KAP The Big Ten, while value 0 audited by KAP nonThe Big Ten. 
Tunneling incentive is proxied by their manufacturing company which under the control 
of a foreign company by having the ownership interest is ≥ 20%. The entity is deemed 
significant to influence directly or indirectly if it includes ownership of 20% or more in 
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accordance with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (PSAK) No. 15 of 2013. 
Sales growth is a sales ratio that can determine a company's profitability and generate 
profits measured by using an indicator of a company's sales transaction can be calculated with 
the following formula: 
Sales ratio = 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1  
salest = sales in the current period 
salest-1 = sales in the previous period 
  
Data analysis in this study uses logistic regression analysis or commonly called binary 
logistic regression , namely logistic regression where the dependent variable is a kotomi 
variable which only has two categories and is vulnerable to values between 0 and 1. The 
dependent variable, transfer pricing, is the dichotomous variable of this study. Thus, the logical 
regression equation model is typed : 
Log (P / 1 - p) = ɑ + β1X 1 + β2X 2 + β3X 3 + ɛ 
Information: 
P = possibility of Y ( transfer picing )        X 1 = corporate governance                            
ɑ = constant   X 2 = tunneling incentive                                                                      
Β = regression coefficient           X 3 = sales growth                                                        
ɛ = error 
3. Result and Discussion 
3.1 Results of Data Analysis 
In this research, there is a dummy variable, so it uses descriptive statistical analysis of 
frequency, which describes the data in quantitative form with the response distribution of each 
determination (1 or 0, yes or no, etc.). The research uses descriptive statistics frequency to see 
an overview of corporate governance variables (X1 ) and transfer pricing (Y). 
 Table 2. Frequency Transfer Pricing 
Sales Frequency Percent  
  
Related 44 84.6  
Unrelated 8 15.4  
Total 52 100.0  
The results of descriptive analysis of table 2, there are 84.6% of sample companies 
with sales transactions to related parties, and the remaining 15.4% no sales transactions to 
related parties. This shows that most of the sample companies practice transfer pricing by 
selling to related parties in planning the tax burden in the company. 
Table 3 . Frequency of Corporate Governance 
KAP The Big Ten Frequency Percent  
  
NO 33 63.5  
YES 19 36.5  
Total 52 100.0  
 The results of descriptive analysis in table 3 shows that 63.5% of the sample companies 
were not audited by the Big Ten Public Accounting Firm, while 36.5% were audited by The 
Big Ten Public Accounting Firm. This shows that most of the sample companies are still weak 
in considering their financial statements to be audited by The Big Ten KAP auditors, so that the 
possibility of fraud could have occurred without close and good supervision from the auditor. 
 Table 4. Results of Analysis Deskriptif 
Variable N Min Max The mean Std. Deviation 
Tunneling Incentive 52 21,830 96,310 47,52596 22.802579 
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Sales Growth 52 -, 841 5,947 , 09362 , 902670 
N 52         
Descriptive analysis Table 4 result shows tunneling incentive sample companies during 
2014 to 2017 has the lowest value of 21.83 from PT Eterindo Wahanatama Tbk. (ETWA) and 
the highest value of 96.31 was obtained from PT Keramika Indonesia Association Tbk. (KIAS) 
with an average value of 47.5260 and a standard deviation of 22.80258. 
The sample company's sales growth during 2014-2017 has the lowest value of -0.841 and 
the highest value of 5.947 with an average value of 0.9362 and a standard deviation of 
0.902670. 
Table 5. Multicollinearity Test Results 




Corporate Governance 0.876 1,141 
Tunneling Incentive 0.880 1,136 
Sales Growth 0.992 1,008 
  
As the results of the tolerance value > 0.10 and the value of the inflation factor 
(VIF) < 10, it shows that the independent variable is free from multicollinearity. 
Table 6. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Results 
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 5,418 8 , 712 
With the results of Chi-square value of 5.418, degrees of freedom (df) 8 with a significant 
value of 0.712 0.05, the hypothesized regression model that was fit is accepted because it 
matched with the observational data. 
Table 7. Overall Model Fit Test Results 
Step -2 Log likelihood Constant 
0 44,650 1,705 
1 28,661 -4,542 
 With the results of the value of -2 Log likelihood 0 of 44,650 and after entering the 
independent variable corporate governance (X 1 ), tunneling incentive (X 2 ), sales growth (X 3 ) 
value of -2 Log likelihood 1 to 28,661. Decreasing in value of -2 Log likelihood indicates that a 
good regression model is hypothesized fit with the data. 
Table 8. Classification Table Test Results 
Observed Predicted  












Unrelated Sales 3 5 37.5 
Related Sales 2 42 95.5 
Overall Percentage     86.5 
a.                                                                                                                      The cut value is, 500 
  
Based on the results of table 8, the predictive power of the regression model for the 
probability of transfer pricing practices is 86.5%, there are 42 companies or 95.5% of 
companies that are predicted to make transfer pricing decisions from a total of 44 companies 
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that do transfer pricing practices while company probabilities are not indicated transfer pricing 
practices, there are 3 companies or 37.5% of the total 8 companies. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Test Results 
  
Table 9. Omnibus Test Results 
Chi-square Df Sig 
15,988 3 , 001 
 The resulting Chi-Square value obtained was 15,988 and free degrees (df) of 3 with a 
significance of 0.001 <0.05 then involving the independent variables was declared to have a 
significant simultaneous effect. As result, corporate governance, tunneling incentives and sales 
growth have a significant effect on the practice of transfer pricing simultaneously. 
Table 10. Wald Test Results 
Variable Coefficient Wald Sig Conclusion 
CG (X 1 ) 
IT (X 2 ) 













Constant -4,542       
 The regression equation is as follows: 
= -4,542 + 1,467X 1 + 0,165X 2 - 0,752X 3 + ɛ 
  
3.3 Discussion 
The effect of corporate governance on the practice of transfer pricing . 
The results of the regression equation show the relationship between corporate 
governance and transfer pricing is negative. The direction of the negative sign implies that if 
the coefficient of corporate governance increases, the practice of transfer pricing will decrease 
and vice versa. Partially, corporate governance can be seen in wald test amounted to 2,063 
with level of significant 0.151. It is stated corporate governance does not significantly affect 
the practice of transfer pricing. 
Corporate governance proxied by audit quality may not affect the practice of tax evasion 
in the conduct of transfer pricing, since there is no significant difference between the 
companies audited by KAP The Big Ten and KAP non The Big Ten. Winata (2014) revealed 
ethics Public Accounting Firm (KAP- Kantor Akuntan Publik) audited financial statements 
referring to the appropriate standard of audit quality as well as the ethics of public accountants 
in practice based on rules set by the Board of Public Accountants Professional Standards 
Institut Indonesian Public Accountant. 
In line with and support with Noviastika, Mayowan, & Karjo's research (2016) revealed 
that the company did not consider good management as a basis for transfer pricing 
activities. Yet, contrary to research by Dewi and Sari (2015), Rosa, Andini, & Raharjo 
(2017), Agusto, Puspa, & Rifa (2018) revealed that corporate governance has a significant 
positive effect on the practice of transfer pricing. 
  
The effect of tunneling incentives on the practice of transfer pricing . 
The results of the regression equation show the relationship between tunneling incentives 
and transfer pricing is positive. The direction of the positive sign means that if the tunneling 
incentive coefficient increases, the practice of transfer pricing will increase and vice 
versa. Partial tunneling incentives can be seen in the Wald test of 5.268 with a significant level 
of 0.022. This suggests that tunneling incentives significantly affect the practice of transfer 
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pricing. 
The increasing practice of tunneling incentives , the company will do more transfer 
pricing. Tunneling is done with related parties, the price agreement can be lower. This research 
is supported by research of Saraswati and Sujana (2017), because the greater the ownership of 
foreign shares held in the company, they automatically also want a large return or dividend as 
well. So when it comes to receiving dividends from minority shareholders, they prefer to 
do transfer pricing by transferring company assets to meet their own interests rather than 
dividing dividends to minority shareholders. 
This study supports research conducted Marfuah and Azizah (2014), Noviastika , 
Mayowan, & Karjo (2016), Santosa and Suzan (2018) results that expressed tunneling 
incentive positive effect significantly to transfer pricing. However,it is contrary to research by 
Rosa, Andini, & Raharjo (2017) which states tunneling incentives have a significant negative 
effect on transfer pricing . 
  
The effect of sales growth on transfer pricing practices . 
The results of the regression equation show the relationship between sales growth and 
transfer pricing is negative. The direction of the negative sign implies that if the coefficient of 
sales growth increases, the practice of transfer pricing will decrease and vice versa. Partially 
sales growth can be seen in the Wald test of 1.174 with a significant level of 0.279 . This states 
that sales growth does not significantly affect the practice of transfer pricing. 
The increase in sales growth can prove the higher the company's profits obtained, so that 
the company is able to maintain management not to make deviations through tax avoidance. 
Tax avoidance by minimizing tax burden payment is one of the practices of transfer pricing. 
This is in line with research Noviani, Diana, & Mawardi (2018) which also states 
that sales growth has a significant negative effect on the practice of transfer pricing . 
Though, it us contrary to the research of Dewinta and Setiawan (2016), Rahmawati 
(2017), Purwanti and Sugiyarti (2017) which stated that sales growth had a significant positive 
effect on tax avoidance where an increasing number of sales of companies wanted large profits 
but were reluctant to spend large tax costs as well so avoid tax in order to minimize the burden. 
 
4. Conclusion, Limitations and Suggestions 
The results of this study indicate that the corporate governance, tunneling incentive and 
sales growth significantly affect the practice of transfer pricing simultaneously. Corporate 
governance does not significantly affect the practice of transfer pricing because of audit 
quality KAP by The Big Ten and KAP non The Big Ten is not able to guarantee the company 
conduct a deviation from the rules in the decision practice of transfer pricing . Tunneling 
incentive significant positive influence the practice of transfer pricing for p eme gang 
controlling stake in power determine the decision so the ownership interest of foreign control, 
the more powerful in doing tunneling well in the practice of transfer pricing. Sales growth does 
not significant affect the practice of transfer pricing negatively because of the high growth in 
sales of the company then diminishing the efforts of tax evasion in the practice of transfer 
pricing. A high sales growth makes a big profit company so that it can run its tax payment 
obligations. 
Suggestions for future researchers, other independent variables related to transfer 
pricing such as debt covenantscould be added. Debt covenants is considered to be more 
important variables in disclosure of transfer pricing because increasing report of changes in 
earnings causes a decrease in technical negligence so that it will choose to practice corporate 
earnings with transfer pricing (Rosa et al. 2017). Also, the future researcher could extend the 
period of the research year and use other population objects to provide better research 
results. While practical for the Government is expected to tighten rules on transfer pricing by 
adding and clarify the content of the sanction if it is found the company violated the rules made 
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to reduce the abuse of the practice of transfer pricing . In addition, the company is also 
expected to pay more attention to every action that will be taken by shareholders, financial 
statement holders and risks borne related to personal interests with tax problems in the 
company. 
This study has several limitations. Firstly , it has very limited variables consisting of only 
three independent variables namely corporate governance, tunneling incentives and sales 
growth. Second, the limitation comes from the measurement of the transfer pricing variable, 
which is still limited to the dichotomy using a dummy variable. The third limitation is the four-
year observation period, namely 2014-2017, which only produced 52 research samples for 
logistic regression which can be considered relatively small. 
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